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Abstract 
 
Two Information Aggregation Mechanisms for Predicting the Opening Weekend 
Box Office Revenues of Films: Boxoffice Prophecy and Guess of Guesses 
 
David Court (AFTRS), Benjamin Gillen (Caltech), Jordi McKenzie (Macquarie University), 
Charles R. Plott (Caltech) 
January 2016 
 
Successful field tests were conducted on two new Information Aggregation Mechanisms (IAMs). 
The mechanisms collected information held as intuitions about opening weekend box office 
revenues for movies in Australia. Participants were film school students.  One mechanism is 
similar to parimutuel betting that produces a probability distribution over box office amounts. 
Except for “art house films”, the predicted distribution is indistinguishable from the actual 
revenues. The second mechanism is based on guesses of the guesses of others and applied 
when incentives for accuracy could not be used. It tested well against data and contains 
information not encompassed by the first mechanism.    
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1. Introduction1 
 
This paper reports a successful field test of two Information Aggregation Mechanisms 
(IAMs) that depart from traditional theory and institutions. The challenge we confront in this 
field test is to collect information about opening weekend box office revenues for movies in 
Australia.  Our primary focus is on the performance of the IAMs when operating in an 
environment that departs from the controlled environments in which experimentalists refine 
and test the mechanisms based on known and fixed parameters.  The question is whether the 
messages delivered by laboratory experimental methods regarding mechanism performance 
are robust to parameters as they are found to naturally occur in the world and if not, identify 
causes for the lack of robustness.  This concern is among the classical questions regarding the 
relevance of laboratory methods for addressing problems found occurring naturally.   
The movie box office test poses some challenges beyond those previously studied in 
field tests of IAMs.  The field test requires a model of how information is distributed among 
people as well as how that information is reflected in decisions.  The tests rest on hypotheses 
regarding both the underlying information available to IAM participants as well as how the 
collected information will be presented in IAM outcomes.  The predictions derived from joint 
hypotheses about these environmental and institutional features are then tested against the 
actual distribution of observed box office revenues among the films. The results demonstrate 
that the mechanism performs substantially as predicted by the theory as it has been tested in 
highly controlled laboratory environments.  The information about box office revenues exists to 
be collected.  The IAMs collect it. 
                                                     
1
 We thank the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation; the Lee Center; Australian Research Council (Linkage Grant 
LP110200336); University of Sydney; Australian Film, Television and Radio School (AFTRS); and the Caltech 
Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science. The computer and software development skills of 
Hsing Yang Lee and Travis Maron are acknowledged. Their skills and dedication made the research possible. The 
comments of Matt Shum were very helpful. 
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Information Aggregation Mechanisms (IAMs) are designed to collect and aggregate 
infomation held in the form of subjective beliefs and intuition dispersed among the 
participants. Their purpose is to quantize, collect, and organize information about the likelihood 
of specific events.  This paper reports the results of a field application of IAM’s as opposed to 
contolled experiments that test the ability of a mechanim to perform the task under laboratory 
conditions in which the information to be aggregated is known to the experimenter.  Field tests 
explore the robustness of the IAM’s ability to collect and aggregate information in  
environments that do not control all features of the mechanism itself, the participants’ skills, 
the event studied, the information available about it or how it is distributed. In the field tests, 
neither the existence of the information nor its quality are known. The questions we must 
address are both (a) whether or not information exists to be aggregated and (b) whether or not 
the IAM is successful in gathering it.  
Traditional IAM architectures are based on markets with Arrow-Debreu assets that can 
be traded in applications potentially lasting days or even weeks.  Neither of the two 
architectures studied here follows that tradition.  No trading takes place as participants' actions 
are irreversible, indeed markets are not even part of the mechanisms.  The excercise occurs 
once and lasts about an hour or less.  The architecture of the primary IAM is similar to 
parimutuel betting processes but explicitly designed to avoid the information distortions known 
to contaminate information aggregation associated with betting processes typically used for 
entertainment purposes.  The second mechanism is completely different and is similar to the 
classical “guessing game” and explores the capacity to analyze events, such as those far in the 
future, or poorly defined events that cannot be used as a basis for structuring rewards for 
accurate information.   
Not only are the architectures of the IAMs used here different from those typically used, 
the conditions of the applications are relaxed considerably. Traditional information aggregation 
mechanisms are deployed in environments in which the information flow is quantitatively 
based and available to IAM participants who understand the information, expect to detect it in 
the behavior of markets, and can act on it in the context of the IAM.  Often IAM participants are 
associated with a business interest and have access to private, quantitative information related 
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to the event of interest.  By contrast, the participants in the application reported here were 
students associated with a film school as well as some industry professionals.  Little or no 
quantitative information existed or was available to participants about the opening weekend 
box office of the movies.  The information existed primarily in the form of subjective 
impressions and opinions based on the properties of the films and possibly the success of films 
that share similarities.   
1.A. The Nature of the Mechanisms 
Two mechanisms are studied. One is a parimutel based IAM and the second is similar to 
the  “guessing game” (Nagel 1995).   
In the parimutel based IAM, called Boxoffice Prophecy (BOP), the range of values that 
possible box office ticket sale quantities can take is partitioned into a set of non-overlapping 
intervals, or “buckets.” The participants in an exercise are given an opportunity to purchase 
“tickets” and a cash prize is awarded to the holders of tickets when the variable of interest 
takes a value within a given bucket. Participants are allowed to buy as many tickets as they wish 
(up to a budget limit described below) and place them freely in any of the buckets. In this way, 
the distribution of tickets placed across the different buckets yields a potential measure of 
participants’ beliefs regarding the future realization of the variable of interest. The information 
aggregation mechanism automatically aggregates these beliefs across participants, allowing the 
construction of “consensus” forecasts while also obtaining a glimpse into the underlying 
uncertainty. 
The second mechanism directs participants to make a guess about the box office of an 
upcoming film.  Each participant submits a single number anonymously as a guess.  The actual 
box office will not be known within a time frame required to base payoffs on the box office 
when it becomes known.  Indeed exactly how the boxoffice will be measured may not be 
known at the time of the IAM exercise since measurment methodologies evolve. Instead, a 
prize is awarded to the individual(s) whose guess is closest to the median guess of all other 
individuals. The mechanism will be called the Guess of the Guesses (GOG).  
Clearly this mechanism is exploratory in that no generally accepted theory suggests 
success.  Typical game theory applications focused on asymmetric information rest on 
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assumptions about an individual’s understanding of the rationality of others.  An alternative 
perspective follows from the intuition that when uninformed about the opinion of others, 
individuals tend to use themselves as a model.  Thus, when guessing what others will guess 
subjects are drawing on their own guess about the box office and rewarded if they are correct.  
1.B. Orientation and Outline 
Section 2 will focus on details of the two mechanisms, their structure, and how 
participants interact with the mechanisms.  Basically, the section answers questions related to 
what participants see and what they do. Section 3 contains background material. Section 4 
outlines the procedures, subjects and timing of the study. Section 5 is a discussion of the 
movies for which the box office is to be predicted.  Section 6 introduces a model of the 
information environment.  The section develops a general model of the information, how it is 
expressed and what it means to aggregate it.  In this model the predicted event is not a “state” 
but a probability distribution and the results of the IAM are interpreted as the probability of 
various box office amounts.  Section 7 contains results. The performance of the two IAMs are 
evaluated and compared. Section 8 is a summary of conclusions. 
 
2. Two Information Aggregation Mechanisms: Institutional Frameworks 
The purpose of an Information Aggregation Mechanism (IAM) is to quantize, collect and 
aggregate information held in the form of subjective intuitions held by different individuals 
about uncertain future events.  Presumably, these events are accompanied by different forms 
of information distributed across a population that can be represented as differentially and 
independently distributed signals.   
The two mechanisms studied, ‘Boxoffice Prophecy’ and ‘Guess of the Guesses’, differ in 
structure and background theory.  Information aggregation models (IAMs) such as Boxoffice 
Prophecy (BOP), rest on a hypothesis that the collection and aggregation of such information 
produces a combined signal that has more information content than any single signal.  The 
mechanism produces a probability distribution that becomes interpreted as the aggregation of 
the existing information. The Guess of the Guesses (GOG) model is not so much an attempt to 
aggregate information as it is an attempt to extract an individual’s information under conditions 
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that prohibit the use of incentives based on accuracy of reports or guesses.  The output can be 
interpreted as the distribution of modes of opinions. 
2.A. The Boxoffice Prophecy (BOP) Mechanism  
Participants interact with the mechanism in the form of an on-line, interactive program.  
They can log in at the scheduled time and participate from any computer with an appropriate 
internet connection.  The process operates in real time during which they are able to place 
small “bets” on various levels of box office amounts. Figure 1 is a screen shot of the interface 
used by participants in the BOP exercises.  The illustration is for a single film.   
 
Figure 1.  Screen Shot of BOP Interface 
 
 
 
Total tickets
sold in this 
column
Your budget 
remaining in 
this column
Number of 
tickets you
hold Number of 
tickets held 
by everyone
Percent of 
tickets you 
hold, i.e. 
3/5 = 60%
Percent of 
total tickets 
sold.  i.e. 
17% of all 
tickets sold
The orange distribution is the implied probability of all 
ticket purchases and the green is your choices.  Notice 
that these are represented like a (horizontal) bar graph.
The participant places the curser on a bucket and clicks.  The spaces turn yellow as is the 
case of the $90,000-$119,999 bucket in the figure.  By clicking on the PURCHASE button the 
individual purchases a ticket in that bucket.  The price shown in the figure is 40 while the 
budget for this participant is currently 20 so the system would refuse the purchase due to 
insufficient cash.  Had the purchase been made the number of tickets held by the individual 
would go up by one as would the number of tickets held by everyone. Percentages would be 
adjusted accordingly. 
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For a given film the potential opening weekend box office amount is partitioned into intervals 
that we will refer to as “buckets”. 2  For description purposes we will consider a single variable, 
say opening weekend box office for film  in week , that we denote by . The positive real 
line is partitioned into  intervals, the “buckets,” where each interval represents a range of 
possible values for the opening weekend box office that will be officially reported when the 
movie opens. The leftmost and rightmost buckets are, respectively,  and .  The 
bucket sizes for the example illustrated in Figure 1 are $ 29,999. 
Mechanism organizers invite participants, who securely log in to their own account to 
access the IAM program. The mechanism makes “tickets” available for sale to participants, who 
spend an endowment of Francs (our synthetic experimental currency) on tickets and allocate 
them across the buckets. At the opening of each application all participants are given a fixed 
budget of 500 Francs for each of the predicted variables. The Francs cannot be transferred 
among participants, used in other applications, or assigned to buckets for another film’s BOP 
excercise.  Each BOP session operates at a fixed time and only those invited are able to 
participate. The IAM program stores a wealth of data, including individual participant actions 
and time-stamps indicating when each of these actions took place. 
The tickets for all buckets are priced the same and that price will increase at a pre-
announced rate to ensure the mechanism closes in a reasonable time. An example of the price 
is displayed in Figure 1. For example, the opening price would be constant for fifteen minutes 
and then go up at a rate of one Franc per minute after that. These price changes discourage 
waiting until the last second to purchase, helping to offset individual incentives to hold back 
their private information and to improve their own information by learning from others’ 
decisions. All participants are aware that their own information might be improved through 
seeing the purchases of others. They are also aware that their own information might be 
                                                     
2 The number of buckets is dictated by screen size.  The size of the buckets is determined by how the film is 
classified.  “Art House” films have the smallest buckets, followed by “Regular” and then “Blockbuster” which is the 
largest.  The movies, classifications, and buckets are discusssed in Section 5.  
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communicated by their own purchase of tickets. The temporal discounting helps to mitigate 
these strategic incentives that otherwise hinder successful information aggregation.  
Throughout the operation of the mechanism, participants have a continuously available 
record of the number of tickets that are currently placed in each of the buckets. At each instant 
during the application, as well as at its termination, the placements of all tickets in all buckets 
are known as is illustrated in Figure 1. The individual participant also knows the proportion of 
tickets he or she holds in each bucket, which is particularly important because these 
proportions are the foundations for incentives. When the actual winning bucket becomes 
known those holding tickets in that bucket are given a part of a grand prize equal to the 
proportion of the winning bucket tickets that he or she holds. If participant  holds % of the 
tickets sold for the winning bucket then participant  gets % of the incentive prize. For 
example, if the incentive prize was $1,000 and the individual held 10% of the tickets sold for 
that bucket then the payment to participant  would be $100. 
A typical BOP exercise involved forecasting two or three films. The exercise takes place 
once a week and requires on the order of 30 minutes with the maximum possible being an 
hour. Each participant is given a separate Franc budget for each film they forecast. All budgets 
are the same size and the budgets are not fungible across the items forecast. The number of 
participants typically ranges from ten to twenty and each operates from a secure computer 
located wherever the participant happened to be located (home, office, traveling, etc). Typically 
the users are anonymous within the mechanism: both the list of participants and the winners 
remain secret. Of course, the total of tickets purchased in each bucket of each forecast is public 
and known in real time as the tickets are purchased. 
2.B. Guess of Guesses (GOG) Mechanism 
 
In sessions focused on the Guess of the Guesses mechanism, participants log in to the BOP 
session and before proceeding further are asked to make a guess about the opening box office 
of films that will open several months in the future.  The horizon is beyond a time interval 
within which the realized box office data could practically be available for payment, implying 
the opening box office will not be known so cannot be used.  Nevertheless, information could 
n z
n z
n
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be available in the same form that becomes available for films in general.  Of course, the guess 
cannot be made incentive compatible in the traditional sense of the term as realized accuracy 
of a guess cannot be the basis for a reward. 
The GOG is based on the hypothesis that the best information about what others might 
believe is introspection.  The intuition is that when uninformed about the opinion of others, 
inidividuals tend to use themselves as a model.3  Thus, when guessing what others will guess 
they are drawing on their own guess about the box office and rewarded if they are correct. That 
is, the best model a person has about the beliefs of others is his/her own beliefs. Thus, the GOG 
procedure rewards the individual according to the accuracy of their guess of others.  Clearly, 
this has a potential for unconstrained possibilities as the infinite regress of the average thinking 
what the average thinks.  Nevertheless, we implement the mechanism and test its 
performance.   
Clearly the GOG mechanism is exploratory in that a formal theory that predicts success 
of the model does not exist.  Figure 2 is the instruction given to subjects.  Each subject is asked 
to make a guess about the box office of the film.  However, the reward is given to the guess 
that is closest to the median of the other guesses.  In case of ties, the reward is split.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
3
 This idea was motivated by insights contained in Prelec (2004) and Weaver and Prelec (2013). The property could 
be a consequence of an “availability heuristic” or, alternatively a “recognition heuristic”. The idea also appears as a 
substantive principle in “false consensus” research.  We use the property axiomatically take no stand on competing 
explanations or the conditions under which it might be reliable as a model.  
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?  ? 
Figure 2 - Screen shot for GOG Mechanism 
 
The first pages of Boxoffice Prophecy ask you for your opinion about others’ opinions.  You are not paid on the 
accuracy of your answer with respect to the actual boxoffice. You will be paid if you are the closest to the average 
(actually median) answer given by others. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Background 
   
For decades, economic theory has explored the theory that markets collect and aggregate 
information contained in prices.  Motivated by the rational expectations and finance literature 
Plott and Sunder (1982, 1988) produced the first experimental demonstration that market 
equilibration and associated prices can perform an information aggregation function. The idea 
that markets could be designed and implemented to aggregate important information followed 
almost immediately with an application to sales forecasting (Chen and Plott, 2002; Plott, 2000) 
and election predictions (Berg, et al. 2008). These market based applications were followed by 
of numbers of papers and interest sufficient to attract the attention of the Commodities 
Futures Trading Commission.    
While the feasibility of IAMs and their application to important problems is established, 
practical challenges are abundant.  Market-based IAMs and prediction markets face practical 
challenges inside businesses. Real time, multiple markets of Arrow-Debreu securities require 
training on tendering the bids and asks; inventory and cash management; and information 
Notice that we are NOT asking you what you think the boxoffice will be.  We are asking the individuals in the 
group what they think that the average (median) of the group thinks. What do you think that the average 
(median) person of the group thinks that others think?  Your personal thoughts about the boxoffice could be 
very different. Think for a minute. 
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management of time series of order flow data.  In addition, market participation requires time.  
Management of markets requires infrastructure and time for posting results, constant 
encouragement for participation and technology repairs. Basically, the operation of continuous-
time multiple markets is costly.   
In a series of laboratory experiments, Plott, Wit and Yang (2003) discovered that 
parimutuel betting systems are capable of performing information aggregation but the 
performance levels are poor.  A long series of research papers isolated institutional 
improvements resulting in the architecture used here. 4  Continuous time order flow was shown 
to be important for information aggregation in the first market experiments and was retained 
in the parimutuel based IAM.  A tendency for participants to postpone ticket prices until final 
moments and free ride on information reveled by others was corrected by implementing an 
increasing price of tickets thereby making purchase delays costly (Axelrod, et al.2009). The 
speed of price increase became a tool to limit the time devoted to the exercise. The time 
required for participation and the timing of participation both reflected the opportunity cost of 
participation.  The risk that is implicit in parimutuel betting, had a tendency to inhibit ticket 
purchases and limit the inflow of information into the mechanism.  The participation risk was 
corrected by removing the self-financing feature of parimutuel betting was replaced with a 
prize to winning bucket ticket holders in proportion to holdings.  Ticket purchases were in terms 
of a synthetic currency that had no value outside the experiment and initial endowments of 
currency given to participants.  Thus, the participants had an incentive to spend their entire 
budget and risk aversion was minimized as a barrier to participation (Plott and Roust, 2009).  
Furthermore, relative purchasing power among participants and the selection of participants 
become controlled. Carefully constructed screens and instructions were needed to facilitate a 
quick and accurate understanding and avoid misconceptions about a mechanism that was 
                                                     
4 Papers by Axelrod, et.al. (2009) and Plott and Roust (2009) added both understanding and features.  Axelrod, 
et.al. (2009) demonstrated that the addition of a time clock and an increasing price of parimutuel tickets would 
increase the speed with which information flowed into the system.  Plott and Roust (2009) demonstrated that poor 
information aggregation was related to weak signals. When the signals are weak, information aggregation is poor, 
primarily because risk aversion prevented agents acting on poor information. That information exists to be 
reflected in the decisions of others is not revealed. Those two studies lead to the major features of the 
architecture implemented in Intel and in Boxoffice Prophecy. More recently the results of Kalovcova, et al. (2009) 
and Koessler, et al.  (2012) have added depth to the understanding. 
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otherwise very foreign to participants.  As a result of the sequence of changes the IAM 
efficiencies improved dramatically. 
The first field application of the parimutuel IAM was conducted inside Intel Corporation 
(Gillen, Plott and Shum, 2015). Among the many potential Intel applications those chosen 
existed in environments considered as good candidates for successes.  Indeed, the performance 
of the IAM inside Intel is impressive in terms of assessing the probability of events and 
performance levels exceeding those of Intel official forecasts. The events were quarterly sales 
of well-defined categories of products. Past statistics were available as were quantitative 
measures, formal models and continuous updates of flows of indicator variables thought 
relevant.  Participants were experienced sales personnel and managers with detailed 
knowledge of the business and had substantial experience working with the mechanism and 
understanding its accuracy.  
By contrast, as a robustness test the box office application goes beyond the Intel 
application in terms of (i) the inexperience of the participants (Intel participants had years of 
experience and feedback with the mechanism focused on the same or similar commodities 
while the subjects in the BOP had at most 20 decision sessions in which 77 different film box 
offices were considered); (ii) the poor quality of the information available to participants (Intel 
participants had flows of quantitative data, including statistical models, from a variety of 
sources that held information about upcoming sales while the BOP subjects had no systematic 
flow of data about the Australian box office of any particular movie.)   
The motion picture industry provides an example of products (i.e. movies) that are 
notarized for high levels of uncertainty (De Vany, 2004). The ability to predict box office 
revenues has proved challenging but studies reveal the subtle sources where it might exist. 
Useful surveys of econometric and related studies are provided by Eliashberg, et al. (2006), 
Hadida (2008), and McKenzie (2012).  Other researchers have utilized data from online 
discussion forums and social networks to examine box office predictability.  Mishne and Glance 
(2006) examine sentiment from weblogs.  Doshi, et al. (2009) use movie ratings (IMDb users 
and Rotten Tomatoes critics), social network analysis on websites and blogs, and sentiment 
analysis of IMDb forum posts. Asur and Huberman (2010) develop a model based on Twitter 
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posts (tweet rate per day over the week prior to release).  Metsyan, et al. (2013) study data 
from Wikipedia editors and users.  Recently, Google (2013) have also released a white paper 
documenting a predictive relationship between search volume and opening weekend box office 
revenues. 
An ongoing market-based prediction exists as the Hollywood Stock Exchange (HSX), a 
virtual stock market where participants trade stocks tied to box office revenue outcomes.  A 
number of academics have noted that the prices correlate with actual box office outcomes 
including Pennock, et al. (2001), Spann and Skiera (2009), Foutz and Jank (2010), and McKenzie 
(2013).  Another (discontinued) industry based process developed by the popular Box Office 
Mojo movie website existed as the Box Office Derby and involved participants guessing box 
office for selected movies each week.  McKenzie (2013) found the aggregated guesses are 
frequently close to the actual box office as well as being very highly correlated with the HSX 
predictions. 
It is tempting to conclude that the information about box offices exists and is high 
quality but several features suggest that existing tests might not be particularly challenging.  
Predictions from HSX and Box Office Derby tend to be within the final week or, in the case of 
the HSX, the final closing price the day prior to release.5  These mechanisms only consider 
movies with wide screen distribution, whereas smaller movies like art houses are not in the 
mix.  Also, the HSX is widely known to have thousands of registered participants and McKenzie 
(2013) notes the Derby had 350-800 participants per week over his sample period.  Anecdotally, 
it is also known that many of the HSX and Derby participants were employed within the 
industry and possibly operated under incentives that differed from simply predicting the box 
office.  Everything considered, the studies certainly suggest the existence of information but its 
quality and the power of these mechanisms to collect it are questions that require study. 
 
4.  Procedures  
Boxoffice Prophecy (BOP) and Guess of Guesses (GOG) sessions took place in a series of 
stages within the calendar years 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012 as was dictated by the available of 
                                                     
5
 Foutz and Jank (2010) is an exception who investigate the price path to assist in forecasts of box office revenues. 
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funding.  A total of 77 films were studied in 37 sessions resulting in 118 forecasts.  Over this 
period 167 participants were involved and paid a total of approximately $62,000 (AUD). The 
summary statistics are contained in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1. Number of Sessions, Films, Participants and Payments 
 
Period 
Weeks of 
Operation 
No.  
Films 
No. BOP 
Forecasts 
No. GOG 
Forecasts 
No. 
Participants 
Approx. 
Payments 
2006 16 16 32 0 75 $20,000 
2008 3 3 6 0 13 $  1,500 
2010 8 17 24 24 37 $19,500 
2012 11 41 22 20 42 $21,000 
Total 37 77 84 41 167 $62,000 
 
Subjects were a mix of current and former students of the Australian Film, Television 
and Radio School (AFTRS) as well as a small number of industry professionals working in various 
capacities within the industry (e.g. theatrical distribution or exhibition).  Some of the students 
were actively engaged in film production and other parts of the industry while others were full 
time students.  Potential subjects were contacted through lists of existing and previous 
students and instructed to log into the Boxoffice Prophecy website and register in the database 
if they were interested in participation.  Once in the database all communication was by email 
and regular updates to the website.   
The website had instructions for participation (Appendix B), a practice website that 
allowed practice alone or with others, a schedule of films together with standard release 
information about the film, and a list of frequently ask questions. The practice website had 
examples of historical applications including ticket purchase for different box office amounts for 
different movies together with the final box office.  Thus, the participants had evidence that the 
ticket sales can carry information. The instructions included perspective about mistakes 
typically associated with confusion with questionnaires to which they are often exposed and 
confusion with gambling systems.  For example, they were told that the task they were asked to 
perform was not to tell us their opinion about the film, its artistic quality or its social value.  The 
task was to make as much money as possible given their information and the decisions of 
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others.  They were also told that dominated strategies could be viewed as mistakes. In the BOP 
exercise, possible examples included putting all funds in one bucket when the subject did not 
think that bucket would win with certainty; putting nothing in buckets that were likely and for 
which ticket sales were low; buying multiple tickets in a bucket in which no one else is buying.  
The dominated of the latter follows from the fact that if only one ticket is sold in a bucket the 
prize goes to the holder of that ticket so multiple tickets have no extra value if a buyer is alone.  
Over the weeks of each iteration, the results of previous BOP exercises including the 
investments in buckets and final box office outcome were added to the website. 
Subjects were given private links to their own earnings.  Payment was by deposit to 
their bank account. The website also had weekly information links that summarized the results 
of the previous week. The potential prizes and payoffs were announced in the event that films 
were cancelled or other unexpected events occurred. They were told and reminded that a 
significant amount of prize money was available each week. 
 
5.  Movies, Characteristics and Measurements 
The 77 films we analyze are listed in the table of Appendix A, which categorizes films 
according to (i) the Boxoffice Prophecy (BOP) and/or Guess of Guesses (GOG)  date; (ii) the 
release date of the film; (iii) the bucket size for the particular title (see Table 2 and discussion 
below);  (iv) the film type  used in the empirical analysis (Art House, Regular, or Blockbuster); (v) 
revenue definition (opening day, opening weekend or total theater run); (vi) list of BOP 
measurements; and (vii) list of GOG measurements. Art House films are typically released by 
small studios while blockbusters are released by major studios backed by large production 
budgets and publicity.  These terms are well-known to experts in the industry and films are 
readily classified accordingly, with the range of possible box office revenue suggested by 
historical experience. 
Table 2 lists the number of buckets and size used for the different movies.  The number 
of buckets was always 16, dictated by interface screen size, judgments about instructions and 
other subjective issues associated with experimental design.  The range of the buckets tended 
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to be the same for similarly classified films.  However, over the course of the trials some 
adjustments were made reflecting issues related to the film and economic conditions. 
Table 2. Film Classification, Bucket Size, and Range 
 
Iteration 
Bucket 
Design 
Revenue 
Prediction 
No. 
Buckets 
Lower  
Bucket size 
Bucket 
Size 
Upper  
Bucket Size 
No. 
Films 
2006 &  Small Weekend 16 [0,$49,999] $49,999 $750,000+ 11 
2008 Small Total 16 [0,$499,999] $499,999 $7,500,000+ 11 
 
Large Weekend 16 [0,$199,999] $199,999 $3,000,000+ 8 
  Large Total 16 [0,$1,999,999] $1,999,999 $30,000,000+ 8 
2010 Small Weekend 16 [0,$29,999] $29,999 $450,000+ 6 
  Large Weekend 16 [0,$799,999] $799,999 $12,000,000+ 11 
2012 Small Weekend 16 [0,$19,999] $9,999 $160,000+ 2 
 
Small-Med Weekend 16 [0,$49,999] $24,999 $400,000+ 8 
 
Med-Large Weekend 16 [0,$499,999] $249,999 $4,000,000+ 6 
 
Large Weekend 16 [0,$1,499,999] $749,999 $12,000,000+ 5 
  Extra-Large Weekend 16 [0,$2,999,999] $999,999 $16,000,000+ 1 
 
 
6.  A Model for Information Aggregation in BOP and GOG 
 
 In order to evaluate the performance of the Boxoffice Prophecy (BOP) and Guess of 
Guesses (GOG) mechanisms, we develop a formal model of the information available to 
participants, how that information influences participants’ beliefs, and how it relates to realized 
box office revenues.  This characterization represents the aggregated information held by 
participants as a sufficient statistic reporting the expected likelihood of different possible box 
office ticket sales levels. We then model how incentives can guide participants to an 
equilibrium outcome in the BOP and GOG mechanisms that accurately aggregates this 
information.  While other equilibria for the mechanisms might exist, the theoretical results 
establish that the observed success of these mechanisms as reported in laboratory 
environments is not inconsistent with theory and thus suggest the interpretation and 
application to other field environments.   
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6.A. Individual Information and Beliefs when the State of Nature is a Distribution 
 Boxoffice Prophecy and the Guess of Guesses mechanisms attempt to forecast an 
outcome that is subject to multiple tiers of uncertainty.  Not only are participants uncertain 
about what final sales will be, they are uncertain about the conditional distribution from which 
realized sales will be drawn.  This higher-order uncertainty requires describing a stochastic 
environment with aggregate uncertainty both in realized sales and in the conditional 
distribution over sales.   
For ease of exposition, denote realized sales for movie t by Yt and suppose the potential 
values of realized sales are restricted to a discrete set of K different values, X={x1,…,xK}, so 
that the distribution of realized sales can be represented by a multinomial distribution.  
Specifically, letting k = Pr{Yt  xk} and conditioning on  = [1,…,K]', we can write Yt|  ~ 
MN( ) to represent the multinomial distribution for Yt’s realized value without further loss of 
generality. 
How participants might learn about these probabilities is suggested by a direct 
application of the Bayes’ rule.  Suppose a player starts with some prior beliefs on the 
distribution over sales  ~ F0().  As the player learns about the movie, its plot synopsis, 
directors, actors, budget, and other information, they will update their beliefs about this 
distribution.  Indexing a representative player by n and denoting this acquired and perceived 
information by sn, we can represent player n’s  beliefs given this information by  the 
conditional distribution over probabilities | sn ~ Fn().  Taking the conditional expectation of 
these probabilities, player n’s expectation for the probability distribution over states can be 
denoted by .  Given these expected probabilities, player n’s expected value can be 
denoted .   
Now, suppose players can participate in unfettered communication, sharing their 
information freely and openly without distortionary incentives.  Such communication could in 
principle allow them to pool all their signals.  If there are N players, then the conditional 
distribution over probabilities can be written | s1,…,sN ~ F*() and the expected probability 
distribution can be represented by .  This final distribution represents all 
 |n nE s 
 
1
|
K
n n nk kk
Y E Y X  

  
 * 1| , NE s s 
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information available to participants regarding the potential values of box office sales and given 
the information available the aggregated expectation  
represents the best forecast for possible box office revenues. As we will see in the next section, 
this distribution and aggregated expectation play a central role in defining the ex-post 
equilibrium of BOP. 
We define two different aspects of information aggregation corresponding to the 
different features of uncertainty captured by the BOP and GOG mechanisms.  A mechanism 
aggregates distributional information if the mechanism generates a signal relating to the 
probabilities  that matches .  Further, mechanism aggregates expectation information if the 
mechanism generates a forecast of sales that matches   As the BOP is designed to reflect the 
different probabilities of different outcomes, we can evaluate the degree to which it 
successfully aggregates distributional information as well as expectation information.  The GOG 
mechanism is specifically focused on deriving a point estimate that characterizes expectations, 
so our tests focus primarily on whether the GOG aggregates expectation information.  
 
Definition:  Suppose  | ~Y MN   and suppose players 1,..., N  privately observe signals 
1,..., Ns s  that are informative about  and, consequently, about Y as well.  Let 
 and * *,1
K
k kk
Y x

 represent the conditional expected probabilities of 
each state and conditional expectation for Y given all information available to participants.   
 A mechanism G that generates a forecast ˆG  for  aggregates distributional information 
if *ˆG  .  
 If the mechanism G generates a forecast ˆ
GY for Y, that forecast aggregates expectation 
information if *
ˆ
GY Y . 
 
In a laboratory environment, *  is known by virtue of experimental controls and is thus 
available to researchers when testing the underlying model. However, in field environments, 
such as box office prediction, only the realized sales become available and only after the box 
office becomes known. By hypothesis, the best available information about the box office can 
be no better than the actual box office, which becomes the substance of tests and evaluations.  
 * * *1|
K
k kk
Y E Y X  

  
*
*Y
 * 1| , NE s s 
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We discuss these tests after presenting a summary of the data in the next section, now turning 
to consider how the mechanisms’ incentives guide participants’ behavior so that information 
aggregation can be achieved.   
 
 
6.B. Incentives, Behavior, and Information Aggregation in Box Office Prophecy  
The BOP mechanism shares many features with the Information Aggregation 
Mechanisms studied experimentally in Plott, Wit, and Yang (2003) and Axelrod, et al. (2009).  
The mechanism is closest to that studied in a field implementation forecasting revenue at Intel 
by Gillen, Plott, and Shum (2015), which presents a general model that heavily influenced the 
discussion here.  This model is used to characterize key features of the BOP’s incentives and 
how they support distributional information aggregation.  The model hinges on the incentives 
that encourage individuals to demonstrate their differential information in their ticket 
placements within the BOP.  Through these incentives, private information becomes publicly 
revealed, with the mechanism providing a device for incorporating information into the 
information that has already been publicly revealed.  
To characterize the BOP’s state at instance t , suppose each bucket k  has  t
k  tickets in 
it, allowing  t  to denote the state vector of tickets across all buckets in the BOP.  Suppose 
player n ’s interim posterior at time t  after conditioning on the BOP's state and his private 
information, is characterized by expected bucket probabilities      ,1 ,= , ,
t t t
n n n Kp p p  
.  
Abstracting from beliefs about future behavior, player n ’s expected payoff to placing an 
additional ticket in bucket kx  would simply be his posterior expected probability for the 
realized outcome falling in that bucket divided by the number of tickets already placed in the 
bucket:  
    
 
 
,
( | , ) =
1
t
t t n k
n k n t
k
p
V x s 

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If player n  is a risk neutral, and an expected utility maximizing agent, then he would 
place his ticket in the bucket that has the best “odds,” i.e., the bucket with the largest posterior 
likelihood 
,n kp  relative to the number of tickets placed in that bucket (
 
1
t
k ). 
Now, suppose player n  has already placed ,n k  tickets in bucket kx  while continuing to 
myopically ingore beliefs and considerations about future behavior.  Accounting for previous 
placements by player n and others, the marginal expected payoff from placing an additional 
ticket in bucket kx  is  
, ,
,
1
| , , =
1
n k n k
n k n n n k
k k
V x s p
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
Now, notice that the placement is on the subjective most likely bucket and is thus information 
revealing only if 
, /n k k    is small. The property demonstrates that the capacity of ticket 
placment to reveal information is dependent on the path of the dynamic process of individual 
ticket placement.  
Given these complex dynamics, it is tempting to conclude that information aggregation 
is not possible in the absence of a convincing theory of the dynamic path, so that the most 
conclusive theory to hope for would be an impossibilitly result.  However, both our theoretical 
and empirical results demonstrate that this pessimism is not justified.   
An expedient way to abstract from dynamics and ensure that the BOP mechanism 
doesn’t distort incentives to report is to consider ex-post equilibria.  A strategy profile for player 
n  can be represented by ,1 ,,...,n n n K  
    , the number of tickets placed in each of the K 
buckets.  Following Krishna (2010)’s textbook definition of an ex-post equilibrium, agents’ 
strategies must represent best responses when evaluated after conditioning on all private 
signals.  The beliefs implied by this information set conveniently matches the aggregated 
distributional information,  * 1| ,..., NE s s   introduced in the previous subsection.  An 
important consequence of ex-post equilibrium is that a consensus emerges in the sense that all 
agents have the same belief about the likelihood of different states.  Further, for a strategy 
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profile to represent an ex-post equilibrium, all agent must have no incentive to change their 
own ticket placements given the placement of others, so that:  
   1 1 1 1 1| ,..., , ,..., | ,..., , ,..., ,n N N n N N n KV s s V s s            
The theoretical concern, then, is whether or not the mechanism and its implementation 
introduce incentives leading participants to distort the aggregated distributional information.  
Our next says that the answer is "no" by characterizing the unique ex-post equilibrium for the 
mechanism and demonstrating that information aggregates in this equilibrium.   
Theorem.  Maintaining the assumptions used to define information aggregation, suppose all 
players follow the symmetric strategy of placing tickets so that *n  .  Then: 
a) This outcome represents an ex-post Nash Equilibrium of the BOP Mechanism. 
b) This outcome is the unique ex-post Nash Equilibrium of the mechanism. 
c) The distribution over tickets for the BOP mechanism under the ex-post equilibrium 
aggregates distributional information about box office sales. 
Proof.  We begin by demonstrating that the proposed strategy profile constitutes an ex-post 
Nash equilibrium.  Suppose *i  for all i except n .  Given the information available about 
expected bucket probabilities and other players’ ticket placements, it is optimal for player n  to 
also place their tickets proportionally to the expected bucket probabilities.  This partial-
equilibrium result establishes that *n   is a best response for all players. 
(a) Consider the decision problem faced by the n -th player, conditioning on the players’ 
beliefs , *,=n k kp   and the assumption that all other players are placing their tickets 
proportionally to the aggregate posterior beliefs. Player n ’s payoff from any ticket allocation is:  
 
 
 
 
, ,
1 1 *,
=1 =1*, , *, ,
| , , , = | , , , =
1 1
K K
n k n k
n N k N k
k kk n k k n k
E u s s E s s
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 
    
   
      
   
 Taking first order conditions of the Lagrangian that incorporates a shadow cost (  ) for the 
constraint that tickets be fully allocated:  
  
 
  
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,
=1
= 1
K
n k
k
  
The budget constraint enforces these first order conditions to balance across each of the K  
buckets, so player n ’s utility maximizing strategy accords with the equilibrium prediction that 
the players allocate tickets according to the posterior expected bucket probabilities. 
 
 
  
 
  
2 2
*, *, , *,
2 2
, *,
*, , *, ,
1 1
= =
1 1
k k n k k
n j j
k n k j n j
N N
N N
   
    
 
   
 
 
(b) We now establish uniqueness of the equilibrium outcome. First, we show that at 
least one player has a profitable deviation if the IAM’s distribution of tickets is not proportional 
to the agreed-upon posterior odds. Second, we show that asymmetric ticket allocations are not 
supportable with agreement. 
(i) Denote the IAM’s distribution of tickets over buckets by   and suppose   is not 
proportional to 
* , then at least one player has a profitable deviation. 
Without loss of generality, suppose *,1 1>   and order the indices so that 
*,1 *,2 *,
1 2
K
K
  
  
   . Choose as player 1 a subject that weakly underallocates tickets to 
bucket 1, so that 1,1 1 *,1<    and select bucket k  so that 1,k k  . Consider the gains and 
losses to player 1 from shifting   tickets from bucket k  to bucket 1.  
 
1,1 1,1 1 1,1 *,1
*,1
1 1 1 1
1, 1, 1, *,
*,
=
=
k k k k k
k
k k k k
N
N N N N
N
N N N N
      
 
     
      
 
     
  
 
  
  
 
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1,1
1,k
Gains from increasing :
Cost of decreasing :
 
We want to show that this deviation is profitable for some > 0 , for which it will be 
sufficient to show:  
 1 1,1 *,1 1,1 *,1 1, *, 1, *,
1 1 1 1
= 1 > 1 =
k k k k k
k k k k
N N
N N N N
         
       
   
   
   
 
This inequality holds by the assumptions of our construction:  
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(ii) Suppose the IAM’s distribution of tickets is proportional to 
* , so that 
*,1 *,2 *,
1 2
= = =
K
K
  
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, but two players are not playing the same strategy. At least one player 
has a profitable deviation. 
Suppose player 1’s allocation differs from the IAM odds. Let 
1,1 1=   , 1,2 2=   , 
and consider the gains and losses to player 1 from shifting = / N   tickets from bucket 2 to 
bucket 1.  
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We will show this deviation is profitable by verifying that:  
 1 1,1 2 1,2
1 2
>
N N
N N
   
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 
 
 
This inequality can be established by direct substitution:  
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(c)  By the definition of *  and the results of Parts (a) and (b), the IAM ticket allocation 
represents rational expectations for  1| , , ,NE s s  . Clearly, if every player places tickets 
proportionally to * , then the aggregated distribution of tickets in the IAM will match this 
distribution. Distributional information aggregation is thus established.   
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The theory identifies the possibility of information aggregation.  It also suggests the possibilities 
of information aggregation failure that be result from the difficulties of operation, complexity, 
dynamics of adjustment, the existence of multiple equilibria and asymmetric equilibria. Thus, 
information aggregation is an empirical issue.  In the next section we explore the empirical 
evidence. 
 
6.C. The Possibility of Expectational Information Aggregation in Guess of Guesses 
The Guess of Guesses (GOG) mechanism is analyzed from the perspective of player 1 
without loss of generality.  Consider ex-post deviations in the mechanism, allowing player 1 to 
revise her guess after observing the choices of all other players in GOG.  Clearly, she would be 
able to compute the median of those guesses and identify either a new guess that would be the 
unique median or pool with the other players submitting the median guess.  Extending this 
logic, ex-post equilibrium restricts all players to submit identical guesses while placing no 
limitation on what the coordinated guess must be.  Given the single-shot nature of the 
mechanism, however, such coordination is clearly implausible.  Consequently, we need to 
consider how player’s form beliefs about other players’ guesses and how they react to those 
beliefs in reporting their own guess.   
The issue is resolved by the observation that if a player believes that the other's beliefs 
are the same as their own beliefs, in which case the optimal strategy is to report that 
belief.  This assumption is supported by the law of iterated expectations, since the coarsened 
expectation of a more refined conditional expectation is simply the coarsened 
expectation.  More precisely, for any random variable Z, , so 
that when accounting for uncertainty in the distribution over box office revenues when taking 
the conditional expectation:   
  
Applying this result to the problem of guessing the median forecast requires assuming 
symmetry for the distribution over sales.  Under symmetry, the median will equal the 
   1| ,..., | |n i iE E Z s s s E Z s   
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expectation and so we can apply the Law of Iterated Expectations directly to the conditional 
median.   
We close this section by again noting that information aggregation within the GOG 
mechanism is not a necessary outcome, but simply a possible outcome.  The degree to which 
information aggregates in practice using either the BOP or the GOG mechanism is an empirical 
question.  We do note, however, that information contained in GOG must reflect the private 
information held by individuals prior to the implementation of BOP.   Our discussion here 
simply motivates some of the economic reasoning supporting this possibility as a means of 
motivating the empirical analysis in the next section. 
7.  Results: Mechanism Performance 
This section considers the empirical evidence from Boxoffice Prophecy (BOP) and Guess of 
Guesses (GOG) to test the degree to which the two mechanisms aggregate information and 
elicit beliefs.  We begin by analyzing forecasts derived from each of the mechanisms and the 
information content of these forecasts indicates that both mechanisms effectively aggregate 
expectation information.  This result indicates both that our subjects have information about 
the box office potential for a given movie and that the mechanisms can collect that 
information.  Since the BOP reveals greater detail about participants’ beliefs, we can also 
investigate the degree to which the BOP aggregates distributional information.  We find the 
aggregated distribution reported by the BOP accurately matches the likelihood of different 
outcomes.  We close this section by returning to the GOG mechanism and, by analyzing the 
distribution over guesses, suggest the mechanism is eliciting a measure of central tendency for 
each participant’s beliefs.   
7.A. Expectation Information Aggregation in BOP and GOG 
If a mechanism aggregates expectation information, then measures of those 
expectations from the mechanism should present rational forecasts for realized sales.  As the 
first step in investigating expectation information aggregation, we define natural forecasts for 
the two mechanisms.  The mean BOP forecast is calculated as the mean of the forecast 
27 
 
distribution for each trial of the BOP mechanism.6  The GOG forecast is calculated as the 
average guess reported in the guess of the median guess mechanism.  These forecasts could be 
defined differently, such as using medians or modes from the mechanisms’ reports, but these 
alternative formulations give qualitatively similar results.   
 
7.A.1 Summary Statistics and Forecast Accuracy 
Table 3 presents summary box office statistics for the movies we studied, along with 
statistics describing the two mean forecasts.7  In the sample for all movies, the BOP forecasts 
are slightly optimistic, with an average box office forecast of AU$200k above the actual box 
office.  The root mean square forecast error (RMSFE) provides a good first-look at forecast 
accuracy.  Comparing the forecasts’ RMSFE to the standard deviation of box office revenues 
indicates the degree to which the mechanisms improve upon the ex-post average as a 
benchmark forecast.  These forecasts perform reasonably well with a root mean square 
forecast error (RMSFE) of AU$2m compared to a cross-sectional standard deviation of AU$7m, 
the latter of which corresponds to the RMSFE of using the ex post sample average as a forecast.  
The forecast presents an especially significant improvement over the ex-post average for 
Blockbuster movies, which have substantially greater variability in revenue.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
6
 We compute the Mean BOP Forecast with a weighted average of the value assigned to each bin, weighted by the 
number of tickets in that bin.  Specifically, if the k
th
 bin pays off if revenues are between xk-1 and xk, we assign bin k 
the value of vk = (xk-1 +  xk)/2.  Since bins are equally-spaced, we assign the first bin a value of (x1 + (x1 – (x2 –x1)))/2  
and treat the last bin symmetrically.  There are several different ways to label these extreme bins and our results 
are robust to reasonable treatments (obviously, labeling the last bin as having an infinite value would be 
problematic).  Given these defined values, if the k
th
 bin has k  tickets in it, then the Mean BOP Forecast is simply: 
 
7
 We drop 10 observations due to issues related to censoring.  For example, Art House films that ended up in the 
lowest bucket when the buckets were designed too large ex-ante.  Dropped titles are noted in Appendix A table. 
1
1
1
BOP Mean =
k
k kK
kkk
v
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


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Table 3.  Summary Statistics for Box Office Sales and Mechanism Forecasts 
 
 Panel A: Boxoffice Prophecy  Panel B: Guess of Guesses 
 All Data Art House Regular Blockbuster    
No. of Markets 74 27 29 18    
No. of Movies 53 19 19 15  No. of Movies 41 
        
Box Office Sales    Box Office Sales 
Average 4,320 669 3,374 11,322  Average 10,553 
Std Dev 7,154 1,614 3,271 11,114  Std Dev 13,337 
        
Boxoffice Prophecy Mean Forecast  Guess of Guesses Forecast 
Average 4,523 980 3,743 11,092  Average 8,790 
Std Dev 6,728 1,913 3,059 10,329  Std Dev 10,082 
RMSFE 2,152 992 2,042 3,293  RMSFE 7,556 
 
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the movies forecasted using the Boxoffice Prophecy (Panel A) and 
Guess of Guesses (Panel B) Mechanisms.  Reported sales and forecast statistics are in units of AUD1,000.  Box 
office Average and Std Dev are calculated across movies in each of the subsamples.  The Boxoffice Prophecy Mean 
Forecast corresponds to the mean of the forecast distribution from the Boxoffice Prophecy mechanism, with 
Average, Std Dev, and Root Mean Square Forecast Error (RMSFE) calculated across markets.  The Guess of Guesses 
Forecast corresponds to the average reported guess in the Guess of Guesses mechanism. 
 
 
7.A.2 Forecast Rationality and Robustness Tests 
 
To provide a more refined perspective of the information content of the mechanisms’ 
forecasts, we apply standard tests for forecast evaluation.  Mincer-Zarnowitz regressions 
evaluate the scale and bias of a forecast by regressing the realized outcome (Yt) on a constant 
and the forecast ( ): 
      (**) 
An unbiased forecast will have  and a forecast with accurate scaling would have .  
Each of these hypotheses can be evaluated individually using a t-test and, jointly, using an F-
test.  Figure 3 presents the results of these forecast tests for opening weekend revenues 
beneath scatter plots corresponding to the fitted-line regressions.    
 
 
 
 
 
ˆ
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Figure 3. Forecast Line Fits and Rationality Tests 
 
Panel A:  BOP Mechanism    Panel B:  GOG Mechanism 
 
  
Notes: This figure presents Mincer-Zarnowitz regressions (Equation **) and forecast rationality tests using the 
Boxoffice Prophecy (Panel A) and Guess of Guesses (Panel B) Mechanisms.  The Boxoffice Prophecy Mean Forecast 
corresponds to the mean of the forecast distribution from the Boxoffice Prophecy mechanism and the Guess of 
Guesses Forecast corresponds to the average reported guess in the Guess of Guesses mechanism.   
 
To evaluate the robustness of these results, we analyze the forecast accuracy in some 
subsamples of the BOP data, slicing according to the type of movie for which revenues are 
being forecast.  The summary statistics for each subsample appear in Table 3 and the Mincer-
Zarnowitz regressions, along with the corresponding scatter-plots, appear in Figure 4.  These 
results illustrate the robustness of information aggregation across the different movie markets, 
indicating that the BOP mean performs quite well with regular movies and blockbusters, but 
underperform in forecasting opening box office for art house movies.  The latter performance 
breakdown is driven by two artifacts that made these movies particularly difficult to forecast.  
First, there is relatively little variability in the revenues for our sample of art house movies.  
Consequently, the simple average revenue for art house movies in general is a good forecast for 
any single art house movie.  Second, the buckets used for BOP in the art house movies may 
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have been too large.  In some of these movies, the smallest bucket was AU$250k, censoring the 
forecasts for movies that had an average revenue of AU$400k.    
 
 
Figure 4.  Forecast Rationality Tests in Subsamples 
Panel A:  Art House  Panel B:  Regular Movies       Panel C:  Blockbusters 
 
           
Notes: This figure presents Mincer-Zarnowitz regressions (Equation **) and forecast rationality tests for 
subsamples of the Boxoffice Prophecy Mechanism.  The Boxoffice Prophecy Mean Forecast corresponds to the 
mean of the forecast distribution from the Boxoffice Prophecy mechanism.  The category of a movie was 
determined by the researchers prior to operation of the mechanism.    
 
 
 
 
7.A.3 Comparing BOP and GOG Forecast Accuracy 
 
In looking at the properties of the GOG forecasts, we first note that the average box 
office for movies in this mechanism is much higher than the average in the BOP.  This selection 
of more blockbuster-like movies into the GOG tests is driven by the long-term nature of the 
GOG mechanism.  Movies that have six months of lead time before their opening tend to be 
larger productions requiring more intensive production and marketing efforts.  The forecasts 
themselves tended to have a bit more of a negative bias, understating average box office 
revenues by about AU$1.75M.  However, despite this bias, the RMSFE for the GOG forecasts 
represents a significant improvement over the unconditional standard deviation of box office 
themselves.  As such, the GOG forecasts do reflect substantial information about potential box 
office revenues.   
Line-Fit Intercept Coefficient
Estimate (77.51)     0.76         F-Stat 10.78       
Std Error 154.09    0.07         p-Value 0.00         
Nobs 27 R-Sq 0.81         
Mincer-Zarnowitz Test Line-Fit Intercept Coefficient
Estimate 367.96    0.80         F-Stat 2.10         
Std Error 652.34    0.14         p-Value 0.16         
Nobs 29 R-Sq 0.56         
Mincer-Zarnowitz Test Line-Fit Intercept Coefficient
Estimate 78.24       1.01         F-Stat 0.02         
Std Error 1,350.39 0.09         p-Value 0.88         
Nobs 18 R-Sq 0.89         
Mincer-Zarnowitz Test
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For a subsample of the movies in the 2010 iteration, we have concurrent forecasts 
available from both the BOP and GOG mechanisms.  Within this subsample, we can directly test 
the accuracy of the forecasts using Diebold-Mariano (1991) tests.  These are simple t-tests that 
evaluate whether the mean forecast loss from the BOP forecast is lower than the mean forecast 
loss from the GOG forecast.  Specifically, for each movie and forecast mechanism, we define the 
forecast loss using squared error: 
 
With this forecast loss, we can calculate the difference in forecast loss between the two 
mechanisms as: 
 
If BOP and GOG are equally accurate, the expected difference in loss between the two 
mechanisms would be zero.  Consequently, we can use a t-test to evaluate this hypothesis, 
, against the alternative that BOP is more (less) accurate than GOG,  
. The results of the Diebold-Mariano tests appear in Table 4, Panel A.  Despite BOP 
delivering a more accurate forecast for 59% of movies, the small sample of only 23 forecasts is 
sufficiently small and variable to prevent this difference in loss from reaching statistical 
significance.   
Given the inconclusive results from the Diebold-Mariano tests, we might wish to 
consider the information content of the two forecasts.  Specifically, if we were to combine the 
BOP and GOG forecasts, how much weight would we assign to the BOP forecast and how much 
would we assign to GOG?  These weights can be easily calculated from the Fair-Shiller 
regressions: 
       
 The results reported in Table 4, Panel B, indicate that significant weight in a combined 
forecast is assigned to the both forecast mechanisms.  The weight assigned to BOP is not 
statistically different from zero and the weight assigned to GOG isn’t significantly differentiated 
from one.  These joint restrictions are tested in the Encompassing tests, which are F-tests for 
the joint hypothesis that the weight to one forecast is equal to one while the weight of another 
      
2
ˆ ,  BOP,  GOG
k k
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32 
 
is equal to zero.  We can reject the null hypothesis that the GOG forecast encompasses the BOP 
forecast (i.e., that  with a p-value of 0%) but we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that BOP encompasses the GOG forecast ( with a p-value that 
rounds to 0%).  These results indicate that both mechanisms contain useful information for 
forecasting actual box office sales.   
 
 
Table 4. Direct Comparison of Mechanism Forecasts 
 
Panel A: Diebold-Mariana Test  Panel B: Fair-Shiller Regression 
     Intercept BOP Weight GOG Weight 
No. Obs  22  Estimate (1,361) 0.31 1.42 
BOP Outperformance Freq. 59%  Std. Error (521) (0.28) (0.36) 
        
Average Delta t-stat p-value  Encompassing Tests F(.,1,0) F(.,1,0) 
(577) (0.21) 84%  F-stat  7.88 10.07 
    p-value  0% 0% 
 
Notes: This table presents direct tests comparing the accuracy of forecasts derived from the Boxoffice Prophecy 
and Guess of Guesses Mechanisms.  The Boxoffice Prophecy Mean Forecast corresponds to the mean of the 
forecast distribution from the Boxoffice Prophecy mechanism and the Guess of Guesses Forecast corresponds to 
the average reported guess in the Guess of Guesses mechanism.  Panel A presents statistics for the Diebold-
Mariano test of relative forecast accuracy.  Panel B presents the results of the Fair-Shiller regression and two F-
tests evaluating whether the BOP forecast encompasses the GOG forecast and vice-versa. 
 
 
These results raise the question of what causes the two mechanisms to generate 
differential and separately-informative signals about box office revenue.  One possibility is that 
both mechanisms, by asking similar questions, cause subjects to consider different aspects of a 
movie and its potential box office appeal in reporting their forecasts.  Another possibility is that 
the BOP mechanism, by allowing for interactions among participants, leads to more refined 
information aggregation than is achieved by the GOG mechanism’s inherently private format.  
This interpretation suggests that the BOP mechanism is able to avoid the “private equilibrium” 
pitfall that presents theoretical challenges to information aggregation in market mechanisms.        
 
  
1 0GOG BOP   
0 1GOG BOP   
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7.B. Distributional Information Aggregation in BOP  
 
 If none of our participants have any information at all about how movies will perform, 
no mechanism for aggregating their information would have any ability to forecast box office 
revenues.  However, the summary statistics in Table 3 indicate that our study participants do 
have valuable information for forecasting box office sales, particularly in larger movies.  The 
next question we investigate concerns how accurately the BOP recovers and reports this 
information.  To evaluate this question, we translate the realized box office revenues into the 
quantiles from the BOP forecast distribution.  Suppose the proportion of tickets in each bucket 
k for movie i’s BOP is k and denote the realized box office revenues by Yi, we compute the BOP 
quantile, denoted Qi, using the formula: 
 
If the BOP’s distribution over tickets accurately reflects the true uncertainty in the 
distribution over realized sales, then these quantiles will be uniformly distributed.  We can use 
this result to test the BOP’s performance.  If either our participants lack information about box 
office revenues or if the BOP fails to aggregates that information, then a Kolmogorov-Smirnoff 
test would reject the null hypothesis that these quantiles are drawn from a uniform 
distribution.   
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Figure 5. Kolmogorov-Smirnoff Test of all Films from BOP 
 
 
 
This figure tests the accuracy of the distributions over sales reported by the BOP mechanism. 
 
Figure 5 plots the cumulative distribution function for these quantiles against the CDF 
for a uniform distribution.  The apparent accuracy of the BOP’s distribution is truly striking.  The 
CDF very closely tracks the 45-degree line implied by the uniform distribution, with the mean 
absolute deviation of only 6%.  The Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test statistic achieves a p-value of 
62%, which is strikingly high even though the sample consists of only 74 observations.   
In order to explore the robustness of BOP’s accuracy in characterizing the distribution of 
a movie’s opening weekend box office revenues, we again turn to the subsamples for forecasts 
by different movie types.  These results are reported in the three panels of Figure 4.  None of 
these tests indicate the distribution over quantiles is statistically significantly different from the 
uniform distribution for any of the samples.  However, this finding could be driven by a lack of 
power due to the limited sample sizes in these subsamples.   
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Figure 6. Kolmogorov-Smirnoff Test for Subsamples of BOP Films 
 
 
This figure tests the accuracy of the distributions over sales reported by the BOP mechanism for different types of 
movies. 
 
 While the distributions over quantiles for Regular and Blockbuster movies are nearly 
identical to the uniform, the results for Art House movies appear to be somewhat distorted.  
The S-shaped distortion in Art House movies is similar to the Reverse Favorite-Longshot Bias 
observed by Gillen, Plott and Shum (2015) when generating sales forecasts in settings with little 
information available to participants. 8 This relationship could indicate that participants had 
                                                     
8
 The Long-Shot Bias arises when market odds overstate the likelihood of low-probability events, an issue that has 
been discussed extensively in the literature (including four chapters in the Handbook of Sports and Lottery Markets 
(Hausch and Ziemba, 2008).  Researchers have also observed the opposite pattern, a Reverse Long-Shot Bias, 
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relatively poor information available to forecast the box office for Art House movies, likely 
because such movies have smaller budgets and are often staffed with less well-known film 
crews and actors.    
 
8.  Conclusions 
 
The paper focus is the performance of Information Aggregation Mechanisms (IAMs) 
when applied to forthcoming films in Australia that consist of a variety of different types of 
films and time frames.  Three unknowns form the questions posed for research.  Do the 
intuitions and subjectively held beliefs of a group of film students and industry practitioners 
contain solid information about the box office of upcoming films?  Do either or both of the 
proposed information aggregations mechanisms (IAMs) collect and organize the beliefs and 
associated information? How can we know?   
The data indicate that the information sought by the mechanisms exists and can be 
measured.  Successful operation is dependent on the information held by participants but a 
large number of participants is not needed and could be harmful if a large proportion is 
completely uninformed.  The information is not found only in highly technical and experienced 
sources.  Specifically, the intuitions of the students as measured by the parimutuel procedures 
do contain information about future box office magnitudes and it could be important that this 
fact was demonstrated to the participants themselves by the early successes of short term 
predications. The strong correlation between the median of these opinions and the outcome is 
not an accidental correlation. The conclusion is supported by aggregate distributional 
information in addition to expectational information. The K-S tests are particularly accurate for 
regular and blockbuster films while the data from Art House movies appears driven by 
censoring. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
which presents as market odds overstating the likelihood of high-probability events and understating the 
probability of low-probability events.  A number of strategic or behavioral features of prediction markets might 
drive these phenomena, including risk aversion (Jullien and Salanie, 2000), probability weighting (Snowberg and 
Wolfers, 2010), heterogeneous beliefs (Gandhi and Serrano-Padial, 2012), and strategic models (Ottaviani and 
Sorensen, 2010).      
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Both the Boxoffice Prophecy (derived from parimutuel betting processes) and the Guess 
of Guesses (incentivized guess of what others will guess) show promise as information 
aggregation mechanisms.  Support is found the summary statistics regarding RMSFE and in the 
Mincer-Zarnowitz regressions for forecast accuracy. The data suggest that the BOP provides 
more accurate and more precise forecasts.  In particular, the Diebold-Mariano tests show BOP 
to be more accurate and encompassing tests indicate the BOP forecast contains information 
not contained in the GOG even though both contain information not contained in the other. 
The fact that GOG represents accuracy based only on private information, acquired without the 
benefit of conversations with others, supports an interpretation of the difference between the 
GOG and BOP as a consequence of information aggregation.  The private information held by 
individuals and reflected in their GOG behavior as compared to the information subsequently 
gathered in the BOP process, reflects information aggregation resulting from the application of 
the BOP. 
A more philosophical question rests beneath the practical questions.  The mechanisms 
were developed from incomplete theory tested through laboratory methods.  Can the 
laboratory methods from experimental economics tell us anything about the operations of the 
naturally occurring phenomena found in field environments?  The first challenge rests on a 
model that that translates the abstract features of the model into the operational concepts 
required to connect the model to variables found naturally occurring.  This connection was 
provided through a generalized Dirichlet distribution.  The approach rests on an assumption 
that the information about the box office is in the form of a distribution of possible outcomes 
and that information aggregation should result in a distribution.  The model is developed to 
produce and test a full frequency distribution of box office revenues in addition to testing the 
accuracy of a prediction of the expected value of box office revenues. The latter is important 
because some IAMs like the GOG, make only point predictions. The developments allow tests of 
accuracy of the two IAMs as well as comparisons of their relative accuracy. 
The second challenge focused on whether or not the economic principles uncovered in 
laboratory experiments and the procedures that evolved from laboratory experiences are 
sufficiently robust to justify a degree of trust in them when applied to substantially different 
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conditions found outside the laboratory. The paper offers a step in toward meeting both 
challenges.  The theory of how the mechanism works draws from both market theory and game 
theory but the understanding provided by these theories is incomplete, leaving much open for 
empirical resolution and a healthy application of “as if” methodologies.  The broad empirical 
relationships suggested do exist and are open invitations for theoretical work. The distribution 
of box office predicted is close to the actual distribution of box office amounts.  Using a KS test 
the hypotheses that the two distributions are the same, the predicted and the actual, cannot be 
rejected.  This result demonstrates that the information exists in the intuitions of the test group 
and that it is collected by the IAM.  Using the RMSFE the expectations prediction of both the 
BOP and GOG cannot be rejected as producing an accurate mean of the actual box office 
amounts.  The accuracy is supported for all types of movies and all futures but films classified as 
Art House are the least predictable and predictability degrades as the distance of the prediction 
advances in the future. Comparisons of the two IAM reveal that BOP is more accurate than 
GOG.  
Reflections on the underlying methodological and philosophical issues give a clear 
message. The intuitions of individuals as represented by subjective probabilities do contain 
solid information. The basic principles of economics are remarkably robust and are usefully 
captured by laboratory experimental methods.    
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FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION 
Appendix A:  Table of All Films 
 
ID Title 
Experiment 
Date 
Release 
Date 
Bucket  
Size 
Analysis 
Definition 
BOP  
(OD, WE, TOT) 
GOG 
(WE, TOT) 
1 Footy Legends 28-Jul-06 03-Aug-06 Small Art-house WE,TOT 
 
2 Miami Vice 04-Aug-06 10-Aug-06 Large Regular WE,TOT 
 
3 Kenny (WE dropped) 11-Aug-06 17-Aug-06 Small Regular WE,TOT 
 
4 The Devil Wears Prada 22-Sep-06 28-Sep-06 Large Regular WE,TOT 
 
5 World Trade Centre 29-Sep-06 05-Oct-06 Large Regular WE,TOT 
 
6 Irresistible 06-Oct-06 12-Oct-06 Small Art-house WE,TOT 
 
7 Boy Town 13-Oct-06 19-Oct-06 Small Regular WE,TOT 
 
8 Suburban Mayhem 20-Oct-06 26-Oct-06 Small Art-house WE,TOT 
 
9 God on My Side (Tot Dropped) 27-Oct-06 02-Nov-06 Small Art-house WE,TOT 
 
10 Like Minds (Dropped) 03-Nov-06 09-Nov-06 Small Art-house WE,TOT 
 
11 The Prestige 10-Nov-06 16-Nov-06 Large Regular WE,TOT 
 
12 Hunt Angels (Dropped) 17-Nov-06 30-Nov-06 Small Art-house WE,TOT 
 
13 A Scanner Darkly 24-Nov-06 30-Nov-06 Small Art-house WE,TOT 
 
14 Charlotte's Web 01-Dec-06 07-Dec-06 Small Regular WE,TOT 
 
15 Eragon 08-Dec-06 14-Dec-06 Large Art-house WE,TOT 
 
16 Happy Feet 15-Dec-06 26-Dec-06 Large Blockbuster OD,TOT 
 
17 Unfinished Sky 14-Jun-08 19-Jun-08 Small Art-house WE,TOT 
 
18 Quantum of Solace 08-Nov-08 19-Nov-08 Large Blockbuster WE,TOT 
 
19 Australia 08-Nov-08 26-Nov-08 Large Blockbuster WE,TOT 
 
20 Centurion 11-Jul-10 29-Jul-10 Small Art-house WE WE 
21 The Expendables 11-Jul-10 12-Aug-10 Large Regular WE(x2) WE(x2) 
22 
The Chronicles of Narnia:  
The Voyage of the Dawn Treader 
11-Jul-10 02-Dec-10 Large Blockbuster WE WE 
23 The Killer Inside Me 25-Jul-10 26-Aug-10 Small Art-house WE(x2) WE(x2) 
24 True Grit 25-Jul-10 26-Jan-11 Small Art-house WE WE 
25 The Sorcerer's Apprentice 07-Aug-10 09-Sep-10 Large Regular WE(x2) WE(x2) 
26 Hall Pass 07-Aug-10 28-Feb-11 Large Regular WE WE 
27 The Girl Who Played with Fire 22-Aug-10 23-Sep-10 Small Art-house WE(x2) WE(x2) 
28 Mars Needs Moms 22-Aug-10 14-Apr-11 Large Blockbuster WE WE 
29 Eat Pray Love 05-Sep-10 07-Oct-10 Large Regular WE(x2) WE(x2) 
30 Scream 4 05-Sep-10 14-Apr-11 Large Regular WE WE 
31 Paranormal Activity 2 20-Sep-10 21-Oct-10 Large Regular WE(x2) WE(x2) 
32 
Pirates of the Caribbean:  
On Stranger Tides 
20-Sep-10 19-May-11 Large Blockbuster WE WE 
33 Oceans (Dropped) 03-Oct-10 19-May-11 Small Art-house WE(x2) WE(x2) 
34 X-Men: First Class 03-Oct-10 02-Jun-11 Large Blockbuster WE WE 
35 
Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows:  
Part 1 
17-Oct-10 18-Nov-10 Large Blockbuster WE 
 
36 Horrible Bosses 17-Oct-10 25-Aug-11 Small Regular WE 
 
37 Romantics Anonymous 13-Apr-12 19-Apr-12 Small-Med Art-house WE 
 
38 The Lucky One 13-Apr-12 19-Apr-12 Small-Med Regular WE 
 
39 The Avengers 20-Apr-12 25-Apr-12 Med-Large Blockbuster WE 
 
40 Irvine Welsh's Ecstasy 20-Apr-12 26-Apr-12 Small-Med Art-house WE 
 
41 W.E. 27-Apr-12 03-May-12 Small-Med Art-house WE 
 
42 Delicacy 27-Apr-12 03-May-12 Small-Med Art-house WE 
 
43 Dark Shadows 04-May-12 10-May-12 Med-Large Blockbuster WE 
 
44 What to Expect When You're Expecting 04-May-12 31-May-12 Med-Large Regular WE 
 
45 The Five-Year Engagement (Dropped) 11-May-12 03-May-12 Med-Large Regular WE 
 
46 Safe(Dropped) 11-May-12 03-May-12 Med-Large Regular WE 
 
47 Bel Ami 18-May-12 24-May-12 Small-Med Art-house WE 
 
48 Men in Black 3 18-May-12 24-May-12 Large Blockbuster WE 
 
49 Declaration of War 25-May-12 31-May-12 Small Art-house WE 
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Appendix A:  Table of All Films (Cont) 
 
ID Title 
Experiment 
Date 
Release 
Date 
Bucket Size 
Analysis 
Definition 
BOP  
(OD, WE, TOT) 
GOG 
(WE, TOT) 
50 Get the Gringo 25-May-12 31-May-12 Med-Large Regular WE 
 
51 Prometheus 01-Jun-12 07-Jun-12 Large Blockbuster WE 
 
52 Friends with Kids 01-Jun-12 07-Jun-12 Small-Med Art-house WE 
 
53 Rock of Ages 08-Jun-12 14-Jun-12 Large Regular WE 
 
54 That's My Boy 08-Jun-12 14-Jun-12 Small-Med Regular WE 
 
55 A Royal Affair 15-Jun-12 21-Jun-12 Small Art-house WE 
 
56 Snow White and the Huntsman 15-Jun-12 21-Jun-12 Large Blockbuster WE 
 
57 Brave 15-Jun-12 21-Jun-12 Large Blockbuster WE 
 
58 The Dark Knight Rises  13-Apr-12 19-Jul-12 Extra Large Blockbuster WE TOT 
59 GI Joe: Retaliation 13-Apr-12 28-Mar-13 NA  
 
TOT 
60 Premium Rush 20-Apr-12 08-Nov-12 NA  
 
TOT 
61 Hotel Transylvania 20-Apr-12 20-Sep-12 NA  
 
TOT 
62 Savages 27-Apr-12 18-Oct-12 NA  
 
TOT 
63 Taken 2 27-Apr-12 04-Oct-12 NA  
 
TOT 
64 Lawless  04-May-12 11-Oct-12 NA  
 
TOT 
65 The Watch  04-May-12 13-Sep-12 NA  
 
TOT 
66 Argo 11-May-12 25-Oct-12 NA  
 
TOT 
67 Gangster Squad 11-May-12 10-Jan-13 NA  
 
TOT 
68 Skyfall 18-May-12 22-Nov-12 NA  
 
TOT 
69 
The Twilight Saga:  
Breaking Dawn Part 2 
18-May-12 15-Nov-12 NA  
 
TOT 
70 Gravity 25-May-12 03-Oct-13 NA  
 
TOT 
71 47 Ronin 25-May-12 16-Jan-14 NA  
 
TOT 
72 Rise of the Guardians 01-Jun-12 13-Dec-12 NA  
 
TOT 
73 Here Comes the Boom 01-Jun-12 06-Dec-12 NA  
 
TOT 
74 Ted 08-Jun-12 05-Jul-12 NA  
 
TOT 
75 The Hobbit: An Unexpected Journey 08-Jun-12 26-Dec-12 NA  
 
TOT 
76 Life of Pi 15-Jun-12 01-Jan-12 NA  
 
TOT 
77 Les Miserables 15-Jun-12 26-Dec-12 NA  
 
TOT 
Notes: “OD” is opening day box office, “WE” is opening weekend box office, and “TOT” is total box office.  
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Appendix B:  Instructions 
Welcome Everyone 
Box Office Prophecy is about to start – and to ensure everyone has the information they need to be big 
winners I have put together this little welcome pack for you all. 
Box Office Prophecy is a fun, interactive process testing your ability to predict box office revenues for 
selected films playing in Australian cinemas. 
This year we are doing something a little different, so even if you have participated in BOP before you 
may want to read through the HOW TO PARTICIPATE section to familiarize yourself with the process and 
increase your chances of making money.  
Box Office Prophecy is ultimately a research project for Caltech and Sydney University in association 
with AFTRS to assess the nature of information that exists regarding the potential success or failure of 
theatrically released films. 
However it’s also loads of fun and FINANCIALLY rewarding. We have $2,000 in prize money every week. 
So gather your information, look over the decisions of others and make as much money as you can.  
We have a great range of films this year – everything from small French art house releases to huge US 
blockbusters – so you’ll have the chance to test yourselves on your knowledge of all different genres, 
subject matters and styles of films. 
There is one big omission! You may notice in the list of films there is a distinct lack of Australian 
productions. This is regrettable and everything was done to try and include some local Australian 
productions onto the list but unfortunately we simply could not get the information we needed 
regarding screen numbers and distribution dates for the Australian films that did fit within the BOP 
schedule.  
That said several talented Aussies have contributed to the films on the list including directors Scott Hicks 
and Christopher Nolan as well as actors Abbie Cornish, Russell Crowe, Hugh Jackman and Chris 
Hemsworth. Also, one of the week nine films, Ted, was partly funded and made in Australia. 
The rest of this pack gives you further information regarding how to participate and specific information 
regarding  the cast, crew and advanced ‘buzz’ of the selected films. Don’t be afraid to do your own 
research though – the people who won big last BOP made sure they were well informed. 
Good luck and– ‘May the BOP be with you.’ 
Gabiann Marin 
The Big BOPper 
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When do we start? 
The date has been chosen.  The red carpet has been laid and the Box Office Prophecy is just around the 
corner. 
BOP goes live on Friday the 13th of April 2012 (what an auspicious day!) 
On that day – and every following Friday – you will have one hour to make your choices regarding the 
box office revenue outcomes of the selected films.  
BOP opens at 12pm sharp and closes at 1pm. 
 
How to Participate 
Short Range vs. Long Range films 
You will notice that each week there are two films which are opening the following weekend, and two 
films which are releasing many months away. 
These are referred to as short range films (released the following week) and long range films (released 3 
– 6 months away) and you place your selections quite differently for each.   
When you login you will initially be directed to a screen which asks you about long range films. 
Long Range Films 
The long range predictions are for films which are to be released anywhere from 3-6 months from the 
BOP date.  Predictions for these films work differently from short range films.  Firstly, they involve 
making a prediction about ‘total’ lifetime box office (up to four months from initial release).  Secondly, 
rather than participating in buying tickets like the short-range films discussed below, you are asked the 
following question: 
“In the blank beside each long range film, please provide a guess about the total lifetime Australian box 
office (up to four months). For each film, the person whose guess is closest to the median (half of the 
guesses are above and half are below) of all the guesses for that film will win $300.” 
 
 Notice that you are not being paid on what the box office turns out to be.  You are being paid if you give 
us an accurate prediction of what people think that the box office will be.  
 
  
45 
 
Short Range Films 
Once you have completed the long range film questions, you enter the BOP prediction environment for 
short range films where your objective is to predict ‘opening weekend’ (Thursday – Sunday) box office 
revenues.  Each week there will be two films in the short range selection. 
Every registered player will be given 500 BOP dollars for each short range film each week.    
You will see that you can buy tickets for specific box office ranges, which we call ‘buckets’. 
The buckets have been determined based on the number of opening screens for the film. And each film 
has been categorized as one of the following: 
 Art house release: less than 50 opening screens  
 Small release :  50 – 100 opening screens  
 Regular release:  100 - 250 opening screens 
 Blockbuster release:  more than 250 opening screens 
You buy tickets in as many buckets as you like. In buying tickets you should consider what you think the 
chances are that a bucket will win and the number of tickets that others have bought on the bucket; 
because you are sharing the winnings in proportion to holdings. You can spread your investment across 
a number of potential outcome buckets and remember that the least likely might return the largest 
return if you are the only one investing in that bucket.  
As the hour progresses you will be able to see where others are buying tickets and will be able to see if 
there is any specific trend happening. However be careful, the longer you wait the more expensive the 
tickets become, i.e. at the beginning of the hour the ticket prices are low but after a short period the 
price per ticket will increase.  So, as more tickets are purchased and trends become evident, the cost of 
a ticket will increase such that near the end of the hour your 500 BOP dollars will not buy very many 
tickets. Think strategically, go with your gut or just take a punt; the choice is yours but whatever you 
decide make sure you make all purchases within that hour window (12pm – 1pm Friday).  A ticket, once 
purchased, cannot be returned, so think carefully about where you place your money.  
You should note that BOP money has no outside value, so you should spend it all. 
The BOP interface provides information on the following (see next page for further detail): 
 The time remaining in the experiment 
 The current price of a ticket 
 The total number of tickets sold 
 Your remaining budget 
 The number of tickets you hold in each bucket 
 The total number of tickets held by all participants in each bucket 
 The percent of tickets you own within a particular bucket 
 The percent of total tickets sold in a particular bucket of all tickets sold 
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As well there are useful graphics included to assist you in interpreting where others are purchasing 
tickets relative to your own purchases.  Specifically, there are orange (horizontal) bars which correspond 
to the percent of total tickets sold in a particular bucket of all tickets sold.  Also, there are green 
(horizontal) bars which represent the percentage of each bucket’s tickets which you own. 
Prizes are awarded corresponding to the proportion of tickets you hold in the winning bucket.  For 
example, if (as in the screen shot below) the winning bucket is $90,000-$119,999, you own 60% of all 
tickets purchased (i.e. 3 out of the 5 tickets) and are paid 60% of the total prize pool. 
The picture below shows the key features of the BOP interface screen: 
 
  
Total tickets
sold in this 
column
Your budget 
remaining in 
this column
Number of 
tickets you
hold Number of 
tickets held 
by everyone
Percent of 
tickets you 
hold, i.e. 
3/5 = 60%
Percent of 
total tickets 
sold.  i.e. 
17% of all 
tickets sold
The orange distribution is the implied probability of all 
ticket purchases and the green is your choices.  Notice 
that these are represented like a (horizontal) bar graph.
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The serious stuff 
BOP is a serious business, and there is serious money to be won so we have to make sure that the rules 
of the game are understood and followed.  
The rules: 
1. You must be a registered player to participate. 
 
2. BOP is only open the Fridays from 12pm – 1pm.  BOP will close precisely at 1pm. 
 
3. Each participant makes one guess for each long range film’s total box office for that week’s 
session. Once the amount is entered it cannot be changed. The winner of the prize money will 
be the person whose guess is the closest to the median of all the long range guesses.  In the 
event that there is a tie, the prize money will be shared equally. 
 
4. Each week you will be given another 1,000 BOP dollars, i.e. 500 for each short range film. There 
is no roll over from unused dollars in previous sessions. Any unused (not used to buy tickets) 
BOP Dollars will be erased from your account at the end of each BOP session.  
 
5. Actual Box Office returns will be calculated based on opening weekend revenues (Thursday-
Sunday takings) as advised by the MPDAA– advanced screenings, special screenings and event 
premieres will not be counted in the box office return. A film has to be released in all major 
states (NSW, VIC, QLD) to be considered as officially released. 
 
6. The Monday after the opening weekend of each short range film we will announce the actual 
amount of the box office and anyone who placed bets in the winning range will share in the 
prize money for that week based on the proportion of their ticket holdings.  
 
7. Winners will not be announced by name; although we will alert all registered players of how 
many winners there were for each session as well as the actual box office of the selected films. 
 
8. Winners will be alerted privately and winnings will be directly deposited into the bank account 
provided at registration. If you need to change or update your bank account please do so as 
soon as possible (see FAQ) 
 
9. Prize money is $2,000 per week distributed amongst the winners in the following way: $700 per 
film for each short range film distributed to winner(s) in relation to the value of their winning 
bets. $300 per film for each long range winner(s). It is assumed there will usually only be one 
long range winner per week although should there be multiple winners the $300 will be shared 
equally between them.  
Further Terms and conditions regarding BOP can be found on the website 
http://eeps6.caltech.edu/boxoffice, by clicking ‘Technical FAQ’. 
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Practices, Logging on and registering 
Go to the home site  http://eeps6.caltech.edu/boxoffice, and click on ‘Want to practice?’ 
Here you will be able to log onto the site and practice placing bets and see how the interface works. On 
this site, you can also access information about the list of films and the film schedule.  
We strongly recommend you PRACTICE before the market officially opens on the 13/4/2012. 
 
FAQ 
Can I practice before the official site opens? 
Yes, the practice market is open now. Go to http://eeps6.caltech.edu/boxoffice, and click on ‘Want to 
practice?’ 
How will I know if I have won? 
You will be alerted through the email address you have provided. 
What if I can’t sign in? 
If you have trouble logging in you can click on ‘I forgot my password ‘under the sign in field on the main 
sign in page. Once prompted put in your email address and last name and you will be able to reset your 
password and enter the site. 
If this still doesn’t work you should contact Gabiann Marin at gabiann.marin@aftrs.edu.au as soon as 
possible 
It is a good idea to check that you can get into the site a day or two before the BOP sessions as you only 
have 1 hour to sign in and make your choices and you may not have your matter resolved in time if you 
leave it to the day or the hour of the session.  
Can I save BOP Dollars to use for later sessions? 
No. You must use the BOP dollars in each session. Any BOP dollars not used will be erased. Everyone will 
start with exactly the same number of BOP Dollars each session regardless of how many the spent or if 
they won real money, in previous sessions.  
What if I miss a session? 
You do not have to play every session. If you miss a session you can simply log in the next session and 
play on.  You cannot ‘make up’ a session. Once a BOP session is closed it is impossible for any choices to 
be entered for those films including long range guesses.  
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How can I increase my chances of winning? 
Play every session and try to get as much information about the films as possible. You aren’t trying to 
work out the biggest grossing films, just what you think individual films may make at the opening box 
office.  
Some handy hints include  
1. Look up similar films opening box office returns. Similar may mean alike in style, content, 
screening numbers or have similar or the same creative or performance people.  
2. Check out the links provided, and don’t be afraid of doing your own research – you may 
encounter something that will make a huge difference to your guesses.  
 
Who can I contact if any of my contact or bank details change? 
Contact Gabiann Marin at AFTRS as soon as possible to ensure you can receive information and 
winnings. Her direct email is gabiann.marin@aftrs.edu.au.  
If you have any other questions or concerns please email me directly at gabiann.marin@aftrs.edu.au 
and I’ll try to resolve it as soon as possible. Please be advised I am not in every day so problems may 
take a few days to resolve- however I will try to get things sorted as soon as possible for you.  
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ADDITIONAL MATERIALS: GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Key variables 
Dear Team, 
Please find attached the final list of films for BOP.  We will send an updated file with film links, 
etc. in due course.  
Please note we have our first session Friday April 13, 12-1pm (AEST).  In total there will be 10 
weekly sessions, each of which will run Fridays, 12-1pm.  
As you will see from the attached spreadsheet, each week we have four films.  Two of these 
are short range (opening the following week) and the other two are long range (opening 3-6 
months).  
For the short range films, we use the ‘pari-mutuel’ prediction mechanism for opening weekend 
revenues (Thursday – Sunday).  
For the long range films, we use the ‘average guess’ prediction mechanism for cumulative 
revenues (up to four months from release).  
For each film we have listed ‘release type’ as one of the following:  
1.       Art house (<50 opening screens) 
2.       Small (50-100 opening screens) 
3.       Regular (100-250 opening screens) 
4.       Blockbuster (>250 opening screens)  
The ‘release type’ is particularly important for the short-range films as it dictates the range of 
buckets provided on the pari-mutuel screen.  Please refer to the ‘BUCKETS’ tab on the attached 
spreadsheet to see the corresponding divisions.  
Over the 10 week course of the experiment, we will be giving away A$20,000.  Therefore, each 
week we give away A$2,000.  For each short-range film, the pari-mutuel prize pool is 
A$700.  For each long-range film, the prize is A$300.  Note that we would generally expect only 
one participant to claim the long range prize, but a number of participants may share in the 
short-range prize pool.  
Please feel free to contact me should you have any questions. 
51 
 
 ADDITIONAL MATERIALS: FILMS 
 
 
Round BOP date Film 1 Film 1 date Film 1 type Film 2 Film 2 date Film 2 type
1 13-04-12 Romantics Anonymous 19-04-12 art house The Lucky One 19-04-12 regular
2 20-04-12 The Avengers 25-04-12 blockbuster Irvine Welsh's Ecstasy 26-04-12 art house
3 27-04-12 W.E 03-05-12 art house Delicacy 03-05-12 art house
4 04-05-12 Dark Shadows 10-05-12 blockbuster What to Expect When You're Expecting 10-05-12 regular
5 11-05-12 Five-Year Engagement, The 17-05-12 regular Safe 17-05-12 regular
6 18-05-12 Bel Ami 24-05-12 art house Men in Black 3 24-05-12 blockbuster
7 25-05-12 Think Like A Man 31-05-12 regular Get the Gringo 31-05-12 small
8 01-06-12 Prometheus 07-06-12 blockbuster Friends with Kids 07-06-12 art house
9 08-06-12 Rock of Ages 14-06-12 blockbuster That’s My Boy 14-06-12 regular
10 15-06-12 A Royal Affair 21-06-12 art house Snow White and the Huntsman 21-06-12 blockbuster
Round BOP date Film 3 Film 3 date Film 3 type Film 4 Film 4 date Film 4 type
1 13-04-12 Dark Knight Rises, The 19-07-12 blockbuster GI Joe: Retaliation 19-07-12 regular
2 20-04-12 Premium Rush 13-09-12 regular Hotel Transylvania 20-09-12 blockbuster
3 27-04-12 Savages 27-09-12 small Taken 2 04-10-12 regular
4 04-05-12 Wettest County 06-09-12 regular Neighbourhood Watch 13-09-12 blockbuster
5 11-05-12 Argo 27-09-12 regular Gangster Squad 01-11-12 regular
6 18-05-12 Bond 23 22-11-12 blockbuster The Twilight Saga: Breaking Dawn - Part 2 15-11-12 blockbuster
7 25-05-12 Gravity 29-11-12 regular 47 Ronin 29-11-12 blockbuster
8 01-06-12 Rise of the Guardians 13-12-12 blockbuster Here Comes The Boom 06-12-12 blockbuster
9 08-06-12 Ted 07-12-12 regular Hobbit: An Unexpected Journey, the 26-12-12 blockbuster
10 15-06-12 Life Of Pi 20-12-12 blockbuster Les Miserables 26-12-12 regular
Notes:
1) Short range film predictions  are for 'opening weekend' revenues (defined Thursday - Sunday inclusive). 
2) Long range film predictions are for 'cumulative' (i.e. life-time) revenue up to 4 months.
Short range films
Long range films
